MAJOR COURT DECISIONS OF 1993

The following is a compendium of major communications law decisions handed down by courts of the
United States in 1993.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ISSUES
Adams Telcom, Inc. v. FCC
997 F.2d 955 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
Issue:
Review of a Federal Communications Commission
("FCC" or "Commission") order dismissing petitioners' application for a "pioneer's preference" in
obtaining licenses to provide personal communications services.
Holding:

that the order pertained to a rulemaking proceeding.
The court further noted that after a careful reading of the Commission's rules, the distinction between petitions for review of Commission orders addressing requests for the pioneer's preference itself
and rulemaking proceedings associated with the
same request is not obvious. Under McElroy Electronics Corp. v. FCC, 990 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir.
1993), the D.C. Circuit held that where an agency
fails to communicate its directives clearly, the court
will not bind a party simply by what the agency intended. The court in the present case held that the
petitions were timely and denied the FCC's motion
to dismiss.
Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC
983 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
Issue:

The FCC's order measuring the 60-day review
period from the order's release date, rather than the
publication date, did not give applicants adequate
notice of the deadline for seeking judicial review.
Hence, the petitions for review, which were filed
within 60 days of the publication date (but 88 days
after the release date) were held to be timely.

Whether the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") had the statutory
power to impose a consortium in lieu of holding
comparative hearings in establishing a domestic mobile satellite system ("MSS") as required by 47
U.S.C. § 309(e).

Discussion:

Holding:

According to 28 U.S.C. § 2344, petitions for review of an FCC order must be filed "within 60 days
after its entry." Under 47 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(1), the
period for seeking judicial review "for documents in
notice and comment rule making proceedings" begins
the day after the document is published in the Federal Register; however, 47 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2) states
that for "non-rulemaking documents," the 60-day
review period begins the date of release, regardless of
whether or not the document is published in the
Federal Register.
The Commission argued that the order at issue
was adjudicatory because it dismissed 39 pioneer's
preference applications; however, the court found
that because the Order was entitled "Amendment of

Because of the petitioners' lack of standing, the
court never reached the issue of whether the FCC
had the power to impose a consortium.

the Commission's Rules

. .

.

,"

and because the order

contained two internal references to "this rulemaking," the petitioners could reasonably have believed

Discussion:
The D.C. Circuit dismissed the petitions for review because plaintiffs ARINC, Omninet and intervenor TRW had no standing to challenge the rule.
According to Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112
S.Ct. 2130, 2136 (1991), to establish standing a litigant must prove: (1) an injury-in-fact that is both,
(2) fairly traceable to the challenged actions, and (3)
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.
ARINC's MSS application had been dismissed
years earlier, and ARINC had not filed another application. Because ARINC was not an MSS applicant, ARINC had no legitimate claim to standing.
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Omninet had no standing, because it had voluntarily
withdrawn its MSS application before entering its
petition in this case. Intervenor TRW lacked standing because the original parties ARINC and
Omninet had no standing.
Arkansas AFL-CIO v. FCC
No. 92-1115, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 31575 (8th
Cir. Dec. 7, 1993)
Issues:
Whether the Fairness Doctrine was codified by
the 1959 amendment to section 315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934.
Whether the elimination of the Fairness Doctrine
was an appropriate exercise of the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC" or "Commission")
discretion in implementing the public interest requirement of the Communications Act.
Holding:
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that Congress did not codify the
Fairness Doctrine in 1959. As such, the court's review was limited to whether the FCC's elimination
of the Fairness Doctrine resulted from a reasonable
interpretation of the statutory requirement that
licensees operate in the public interest. The court ultimately held that the FCC's actions in this regard
were reasonable and appropriate.
Discussion:
Before arriving at its decision, the court first ruled
that because Congress did not codify the Fairness
Doctrine, the court's review was limited to whether
the FCC's action resulted from a reasonable interpretation of the statute. This concept was set forth in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Chevron mandated that a reviewing court must
determine whether Congress directly addressed the
precise question at issue. If the issue is directly addressed, the agency must act accordingly, and a reviewing court need not defer to the agency's interpretation. If Congress's intent is unclear, judicial
deference to the agency becomes an issue. If the
agency's action is judged as reasonable, the court
must defer to the agency's judgment. In this case, because Congress's intent was unclear, the court had to
determine whether the FCC was "reasonable" in
eliminating the Fairness Doctrine.
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The court found that the Commission's action was
reasonable. In the 1989 case Syracuse Peace Council
v. WTVH, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the FCC
presented evidence that the Fairness Doctrine chilled
speech. The Commission also provided data that the
Fairness Doctrine was no longer necessary, because
of the increased number of media outlets since implementation of the Doctrine in 1959.
In the present case, the court found the Commission's argument in Syracuse Peace Council an "undeniably reasonable" explanation for its elimination
of the Fairness Doctrine. As a result, the court upheld the FCC's elimination of the Fairness Doctrine.
McElroy Electronics Corp. v. FCC
990 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
Issue:
Whether a 1987 Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") order could reasonably be construed to give potential cellular applicants adequate notice that applications for unserved
cellular areas could not be filed until the FCC announced that it would begin receiving the applications for those areas, even though the initial service
period had lapsed.
Holding:
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a party will not
be bound by what an agency intended, but failed to
communicate. The court proclaimed that "an agency
cannot ignore its primary obligation to state its directives in plain and comprehensible English."
Discussion:
In the early 1980s, the FCC began its initial cellular licensing. During this time, the Commission
granted licenses to companies that intended to serve
the larger part of a standard metropolitan statistical
area ("MSA"). These companies were permitted to
expand within their service areas for five years. After
the five year period expired, competitors would be
allowed to file applications to serve areas within the
MSAs that were not being served.
The order, as codified in 47 C.F.R. § 22.31
(a)(1)(i) (1987), stated: "We are establishing a period of five years from the date the first construction
permit is granted in each MSA for licensees/
permitees to expand their ... MSAs. A date certain
filing date will thus be established for each MSA
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market."
Petitioners were companies that filed after the five
year period had ended; however, the Commission rejected their applications as "premature" because it
had not yet given notice of the exact date for filing.
The court reasoned that applicants could not be
expected to understand that once the five year period
had expired, they would have to wait for further instruction from the FCC before filing. The court's
analysis revealed that by deciding when the five year
moratorium would end, the Commission did in fact
establish a filing date. In other words, the "date certain" in the Commission's order should be taken to
mean an opening date from which applications may
be received. This would commence when the initial
five year period ended. The term should not, as the
FCC argued, mean that a particular date was to be
set by the Commission by which the applications
must be received. Therefore, the court remanded the
petitioners' applications, with instructions to the
FCC to reinstate the applications nunc pro tunc.
Town of Deerfield v. FCC
992 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1993)
Issue:
Whether the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") can incorporate in
its regulations a policy requiring exhaustion of judicial remedies which modifies the jurisdiction of federal courts with respect to preemptive issues under
47 C.F.R. § 25.104.

ceive-only antennas and other types of antenna facilities, unless the local regulation had a reasonable
and clearly defined health, safety or aesthetic purpose, and did not impose unreasonable limitations or
costs on the user.
Because the FCC refused to address the resident's
preemption claim until his legal remedies were exhausted, the resident sought relief in New York state
court. The New York Supreme Court denied the
resident's claim and held that the zoning ordinance
was not preempted by section 25.104. This ruling
was upheld by the appellate division and Court of
Appeals of New York as well as the New York District Court and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.
Thereafter, the FCC rejected the collateral estoppel arguments and held that its regulations preempted the local zoning ordinance. On appeal, the
Second Circuit stated that an administrative agency
cannot simply ignore a federal court judgment, nor
could it revise, overturn, or refuse full faith and
credit. The court found that the FCC did not have
the power to request or require a federal court to
render an opinion that is merely advisory and that
the FCC must recognize the conclusive effect of the
New York District Court's judgment, which had
proper jurisdiction over the matter.
CABLE SERVICES ISSUES
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.
113 S. Ct. 2096 (1993)

Holding:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that by requiring individual complainants to exhaust their judicial remedies before
the FCC would consider a preemption issue, the
FCC in effect reverted a legally binding judgment of
a federal court into a purely advisory opinion, which
violated the legal principle prohibiting a government
agency from reviewing, altering, or preventing enforcement of federal court judgments.

Whether the common-ownership distinction in the
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, section
602(7)(B), which exempted certain cable operators
from federal franchise regulations, was rationally related to a legitimate government purpose so as to be
constitutional under the equal protection guarantee
of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

Discussion:

The Supreme Court held that the common-ownership distinction is rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose and thus constitutional.

This case arose from an incident wherein a resident of Deerfield, New York challenged a zoning ordinance which made it unlawful to install a satellite
dish antenna on any residential lot of less than onehalf acre. FCC regulations preempted local zoning
regulations that differentiated between satellite re-

Holding:

Discussion:
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
attempted to establish a national framework for reg-
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ulating cable television. In furtherance of the Act,
Congress provided for the franchising of cable systems by local governmental authorities and prohibited any person from operating a cable system without a franchise, subject to certain exemptions, 47
U.S.C. §§ 541(a), (b), 621(a), (b).
Under the federal rules, a cable system means any
facility designed to provide video programming to
multiple subscribers through "closed transmission
paths," but does not include "a facility that serves
only subscribers in 1 or more multiple unit dwellings
under common ownership, control, or management,
unless such facility or facilities use any public rightof-way," 47 U.S.C.A. § 522(7)(B) (Supp. 1993). In
applying this exemption, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" of "Commission") ruled
that
a satellite master antenna television
("SMATV") system, which serves multiple buildings via a network of interconnected physical transmission lines, is a cable system if its lines interconnected separately owned and managed buildings or
used or crossed any public right-of-way. Thus, a
SMATV system would be subject to the franchise
requirement. Respondents, SMATV operators, petitioned for review.
The Court stated that equal protection is "not a
license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or
logic of legislative choices." The Court concluded
that the common-ownership distinction is constitutional on two bases.
First, the Court determined that the existing section 602(7)(B) is derived from pre-Cable Act regulations. Thus, it is possible that Congress simply
adopted the FCC's earlier legislative rationale.
Under that rationale, common ownership was to be
indicative of systems in which costs of regulation
outweighed the benefits to owners. Due to the fact
that subscriber numbers would be an equivalent indicator, the FCC decided to exempt those cable facilities which served fifty or fewer subscribers.
Secondly, the Court suggested that a distinction
between facilities could negate the monopoly power
of SMATV operators who gain a "foothold" by contracting and installing a satellite dish on one building and connecting additional buildings for the cost
of a few feet of cable. Without regulation, a
SMATV operator could charge substantially less for
the additional buildings than a competing SMATV
operator who would have to recover the cost of his
own satellite headend facility. Therefore, the Court
concluded that because the two rationales were "arguable," they satisfied the rational basis review.
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COMMON CARRIER ISSUES
California v. FCC
4 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1993)
Issue:
Review of four Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") orders approving
access arrangements, known as Open Network Architecture ("ONA"), to the entire U.S. telephone
network.
Holding:
The court upheld the FCC's orders and denied the
petitions for review.
Discussion:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit divided the petitions for review into two major groups, MCI and the California petitions. In its
petitions, MCI argued that the Commission's ONA
orders did not provide sufficient protection from the
Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs") discrimination
against competitors in light of the imminent elimination of structural separation of the BOCs' basic telephone services from their enhanced services. MCI
contended that the Commission's approval of these
orders violate the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA") (5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A)) by not adequately explaining why the FCC departed from its
prior policy and by not considering evidence of the
ineffectiveness of the ONA with respect to the aforementioned discrimination.
The court rejected MCI's petitions by holding that
the FCC did not depart "from any previously approved ONA concepts." The court noted that the
FCC's four orders, which basically mandate the implementation of ONA in a piecemeal, "evolutionary"
manner, were not significantly different from those
that this court previously decided had passed regulatory muster. Because the new ONA orders sufficiently resembled the previously approved orders,
there was no violation of the APA.
The California petitions contended that the aspect
of the FCC orders dealing with federal tariffing of
certain BOC enhanced services violated the Communications Act because under 47 U.S.C. § 152(b)(1),
the FCC does not have jurisdiction to regulate intrastate services. The court denied the petitions, holding
that the orders established tariffs for potential interstate, not intrastate, services.
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The court recognized the petitioners' concern that
since states' rates for intrastate services helped to offset the costs of basic local telephone service, the rates
for states will be higher than the federal tariffs, and
thus enhanced service providers may elect to apply
the federal tariffs not only to interstate communications but to intrastate services as well. The court emphasized that this potential problem in and of itself
cannot deprive the FCC of jurisdiction over interstate communications, which the Act granted to the
Commission under 47 U.S.C. § 152(a).
ICORE, Inc. v. FCC
985 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
Issue:
Review of the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC" or "Commission") approval of the
National Exchange Carrier Association's ("NECA")
"flash cut" proposal-an immediate cut in revenues
of average schedule telephone companies (i.e., small
telcos which are permitted to average their costs of
providing service in order to determine how much of
their "fixed" cost they are permitted to recover under
FCC regulations) handling more than 15.9 interstate
messages per phone line per month.
Holding:
The D.C. Circuit held that (1) rational basis existed for the FCC's decision, and (2) the Commission's application of the rule during the remand period was not forbidden retroactive rulemaking.
Discussion:
The court found that because petitioner ICORE
could not prove any methodological flaws in the
FCC approval of a "surrogate" plan which NECA
demonstrated via a detailed analysis that would adequately compensate the affected companies, a "substantial basis" existed for the FCC's decision.
The court also rejected petitioner's claim that the
flash cut was retroactive rulemaking, which was forbidden by the Supreme Court in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
In contrast to Bowen, where a rule which had been
struck down by a lower court was reapplied retroactively, in the present case, the rule was remanded to
the FCC for want of adequate reasoning and explanation, but was not vacated (emphasis added). Furthermore, the court noted that the FCC provided the
necessary support for the rule when the Commission

applied it during the remand period.
The court ultimately held that because the "flashcut" rule was never vacated, it does not fall under
Bowen, and thus was not forbidden retroactive
rulemaking.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC
988 F.2d 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
Issue:
Whether the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC" or "Commission") decision to use the
historical discounted cash flow method ("DCF") for
estimating the appropriate rate of return of permissible revenue requirements of the Bell Operating
Companies ("BOCs") was arbitrary and capricious.
Holding:
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Commission's
decision to use the DCF method was not arbitrary
and capricious.
Discussion:
The court determined that while Part 65 of the
Commission's regulations lists categories of data for
the BOCs to submit, 47 C.F.R. § 65.102(a) provides
that carriers "may include relevant evidence other
than the data prescribed by part 65." Nowhere does
Part 65 state that the FCC cannot employ other
methods that would lead to a full and fair record.
Thus, the use of the DCF method and data constituted a reasonable interpretation of Part 65
regulations.
Moving Phones Partnership v. FCC
998 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
Issue:
Whether the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") had authority to
dismiss the applications of cellular applicants selected by lottery upon discovery that each applicant
proposed to operate its licensed radio common carrier facility with one or more general partners who
were aliens in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 310(b)(3).
Holding:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
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trict of Columbia Circuit held that because the
FCC's dismissal of the applications was reasonable
and consistent with the FCC's strict rules for
processing cellular applications the policy was valid.
Discussion:
Section 310(b)(3) prohibits the grant of a radio license to any corporation in which an officer or director is an alien. The national security policy of this
section has been applied to common carrier radio
stations as well as partnership entities, and was
adopted verbatim in the FCC's rules governing cellular service, 47 C.F.R. § 22.4. FCC rules require
"letter perfect" applications and only permit amendments to the applications for the correction of minor
errors and omissions.
The court found that because the winning cellular
applicants had certified compliance with sections
310(b) and 22.4(b), but in fact had proposed a general partnership with three alien general partners,
the FCC properly denied the subsequent amendments and dismissed the applications as unacceptable
for filing.
The court stated that "Supreme Court precedent
instructs that classifications based on alienage in federal statutes are permissible so long as the statute is
not a 'wholly irrational' means of effectuating a legitimate government purpose." The court also noted
that the national security policy of section 310(b)(3)
satisfied the requirement that there be a "showing of
some rational relationship between the interest
sought to be protected and the limiting classification." The court thus held that the FCC was well
within its authority to dismiss the applications.
National Rural Telecom Ass'n v. FCC
988 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
Issue:
Whether the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC" or "Commission") orders implementing price cap rate regulation for the interstate services of local telephone exchange companies
("LECs") were arbitrary and capricious.
Holding:
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the Commission's orders
were neither arbitrary nor capricious because they
were based on "informed prediction," and thus the
rules were deemed rational.
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Discussion:
The FCC ordered that GTE and the Bell companies shift from rate-of-return rate regulation to price
cap regulation. All other LECs were permitted, but
not obligated, to make the change. Petitioners did not
challenge the basic decision mandating price caps,
but objected to certain elements of the general plan.
Specifically, the small local telephone companies
charged that the ancillary conversion rules which
were intended to maintain the effectiveness of price
caps unduly restrained telephone company mergers
and acquisitions. At issue were the "all or nothing
rule" and the "permanent choice rule." The former
rule mandated that LECs which choose price cap
regulation must shift all of their affiliates to price
caps as well. The latter rule required LECs which
choose price caps to remain under price cap regulation permanently.
The court rejected these claims and found the
rules rational. Although the court conceded that the
conversion rules could potentially impede mergers
and acquisitions, the court pointed out that the FCC
had previously considered the possibility of costshifting between rate-of-return and price cap entities
of "hybrid" firms, which "all-or-nothing" was
designed to cure.
The FCC had found that the aforementioned rules
implied a "forced conversion rule" on mergers and
acquisitions, which was codified at 47 C.F.R.
§ 61.41(c). This rule provided that when rate-of-return and price cap companies merge or acquire each
other, the rate-of-return company must switch to
price caps within one year.
The court found that the FCC had allowed
enough flexibility to the small LECs by providing
for waiver of the "forced conversion rule" when the
efficiencies of a particular transaction outweighed the
risk of a LEC beating the system by shifting costs
between its differently regulated entities.
New York State Dep't of Law v. FCC
984 F.2d 1209, (D.C. Cir. 1993)
Issue:
Whether the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") properly denied a
petition for reconsideration which requested that the
Commission repudiate a consent decree and reopen a
show cause proceeding with respect to an enforcement action concerning certain regulated NYNEX
affiliates overcharging nonregulated affiliates and
passing these overcharges on to ratepayers.
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Holding:
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the FCC's decision to enter into the consent decree was subject to
the agency's nonreviewable discretion, and that the
FCC's actions did not violate the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") or the Commission's own
rules prohibiting ex parte communications.
Discussion:
The FCC alleged that two regulated NYNEX affiliates, New England Telephone and Telegraph
Company ("NET") and the New York Telephone
Company ("NYT") violated the Commission's rules
prohibiting cross-subsidization. The FCC, NET and
NYT entered into a consent decree, without public
notice, in which NET and NYT agreed to almost all
the terms in the Commission's Order to Show Cause
(e.g., NYNEX must reduce interstate revenue requirements by $35.5 million, and pay $1,419,000 in
forfeitures to the U.S. Treasury) in return for the
FCC's promise to terminate all current and new
proceedings arising out of the order.
Petitioners filed a petition for reconsideration with
the Commission, demanding that the consent decree
be repudiated and alleging that the Commission: (1)
acted arbitrarily and capriciously by abandoning its
show cause proceedings without notice; (2) failed to
follow its own rules concerning overcharges; (3) violated its own policy against ex parte communications; and (4) violated the APA's notice-and-comment provisions by entering into the agreement.
The court held that as a general matter, the FCC
is best positioned to weigh the costs and benefits of
pursuing a given enforcement method. Under Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), the Supreme
Court held that except in limited circumstances,
courts should not second guess agency enforcement
decisions. Hence, the Commission's decision was not
arbitrary and capricious.
The D.C. Circuit extended the Chaney rule to
agency settlement decisions. The court stated that,
according to Chaney, barring any violation of the
Commission's statutory responsibilities, the FCC's
decision to enter into a consent decree is presumed to
be nonreviewable. The court noted, inter alia, that
47 U.S.C. § 504(b) gave the FCC discretion as to
the decision to collect and/or the amount of forfeitures "that it has adjudicated under such regulations
and methods of ascertaining of facts as it may deem
advisable."
The court refuted the alleged ex parte violation

argument by concluding that the settlement negotiations fell within an FCC rule exception, 47 C.F.R.
§ 1.1204(b)(7), which permits ex parte communications initiated by the Commission for the resolution
of issues in a proceeding that has not been designated for a hearing. The court noted that 47 C.F.R.
§ 1.93(b) "leaves open the question of when to designate an enforcement action for a hearing." The
FCC had not designated this issue for hearing.
Finally, the court determined that the FCC's decision to conduct the settlement negotiations in private
was fully consistent with the discretion granted to
agencies under the APA. The court stated that although 5 U.S.C. § 554(c) provides that all interested
parties be given the opportunity to consider, e.g., offers of settlement, 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) provides that
section 554(c) only applies to "adjudications required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for agency hearing .... "
Because the FCC's decision to enter into a consent
decree was nonreviewable, and the Commission did
not violate the APA or its own ex parte rules, the
court denied the petition for review.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC
10 F.3d 892 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
Issue:
Whether a Federal Communications Commission
("FCC" or "Commission") price cap order provided
sufficient notice to Southwestern Bell ("SWB") that
the company's mid-course corrections to its tariff filings would be barred outright because of failure to
comply with the mandated price cap mechanisms.
Holding:
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that adequate notice
was given and thus denied SWB's petition for
review.
Discussion:
The court reiterated the principle articulated in
McElroy Electronics Corp. v. FCC, 990 F.2d 1351
(D.C. Cir. 1993). McElroy held that adequate
agency notice requires not the clearest possible articulation, but based on a fair reading of the language
of the order, the petitioners should have known what
an agency expected of them.
Under this rule, the court held that while the
price cap order was not a "beacon of clarity," it did
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provide the petitioners with adequate notice that increases to price caps were to be accomplished only by
the mechanisms set forth in the order. Thus, the
court denied the petitioner's petition for review.
United States v. Western Electric Co.
993 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
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Whether the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC" or "Commission") reliance on a sixmonth evaluation period to determine the reasonableness of the Virgin Islands Telephone Corporation's ("Vitelco") interim rates was justified, given
the Commission's previous indications that the interim rates would be evaluated over the standard
two-year rate monitoring period.

Issue:
Holding:
Whether the district court erred in upholding the
U.S. Department of justice's ("DOJ" or "Department") conclusion that the ban established in the
Modified Final Judgement ("MFJ") prohibiting the
Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs") from providing information services was unreasonable.
Holding:
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the judgment removing the information services line of business
restrictions.
Discussion:
Stressing that the court's role was simply to determine whether the DOJ's position had substantial
factual support and was grounded in reasonable
analysis, the D.C. Circuit pointed to the Department's expert testimony to support its conclusion
that dropping the line of business restrictions would
serve the public interest. The evidence showed that
the DOJ's expert witnesses (which included two
Nobel laureate economists) testified that the BOCs'
entry into information services would actually increase competition, which would lead to lower prices
and increased output of various information services.
Although opposing positions were taken by other
distinguished economists, the court held that its job
was not to determine whether "removal of the information services ban is an optimizing move," but
rather to determine whether there existed ample factual foundation for the DOJ's conclusion. Here, the
court determined that the quality of the DOJ's "array of prominent economists' " presentations was
sufficient to establish the factual foundation necessary for the Department to make a reasonable
conclusion.
Virgin Islands Tel. Corp. v. FCC
989 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
Issue:

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the FCC arbitrarily deviated from standard practice in employing
a six-month monitoring period. The court held that
the Commission did not evaluate Vitelco's interim
rates in light of their impact on the company's earnings as per the standard theory of rate of return regulation, which is consistent with prior Commission
practice.
Discussion:
This controversy centered around Vitelco's request
to increase access service charges for the first six
months of 1990, where Vitelco anticipated a dramatic decrease in demand for interstate access service
due to the devastation of Hurricane Hugo. The FCC
granted Vitelco's request-subject to a reasonable
rate investigation-to protect Vitelco's income stream
and financial integrity, which was especially significant in this case because a prohibition on retroactive
ratemaking would prevent Vitelco from recouping
actual losses at a later date.
When demand was actually higher than anticipated, Vitelco's annual earnings for interstate access
service turned out to be three times greater than its
authorized rate of return. "Annualizing" Vitelco's
earnings during the six month period, the FCC
found the rates to be unjust and unreasonable and
ordered Vitelco to issue a refund.
The Commission's established practice is to monitor earnings over a two-year period to account for
changes in marketing conditions. Throughout the investigation of Vitelco's rates, the FCC indicated the
first six months of 1990 would be factored into the
standard two-year monitoring process. The court
found that Vitelco was justified in assuming that the
FCC would evaluate earnings over the relevant "authorized return" monitoring period. The court found
that the FCC's decision ordering Vitelco to refund
"overearnings" was arbitrary and capricious, where
the FCC narrowly focused on the six month period
without calculating in underearnings during 1989,
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and where the FCC disregarded its past practices regarding interim rates.
COPYRIGHT ISSUES
Atlantic Business and Community Dev. Corp. v.
Thomas J. Subranni
994 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1993)
Issue:
Whether a broadcast license granted by the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or
"Commission") qualifies as property or an interest
in property to which a tax lien could attach under
the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. § 6321,
given a longstanding FCC prohibition against treating such licenses as property, coupled with legal authority denying private creditors from obtaining an
interest in the licenses.
Holding:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that a broadcast license was property
for the purposes of section 6321, and that a section
6321 lien does attach to the proceeds of a Chapter 7
bankruptcy sale. The court also held that the FCC's
policy refusing to recognize liens obtained by private
creditors against a broadcaster's license is not applicable to the IRS's assertion of a secured claim
against the proceeds of a bankruptcy sale. The holding reversed the district court's decision denying the
IRS a lien against the proceeds of the bankruptcy
sale of the broadcast license.
Discussion:
Atlantic Business and Community Development
Corporation ("Atlantic") owned and operated an
AM radio station in Atlantic City, New Jersey. Atlantic filed a petition for bankruptcy in 1986. In this
proceeding, the IRS had a secured claim for unpaid
employment taxes due to federal tax liens that were
perfected before the bankruptcy petition was filed.
When the Chapter 11 reorganization plan failed and
the case was converted into a Chapter 7 proceeding,
the bankruptcy trustee sold the AM broadcast station and all its assets.
The bankruptcy court held, and the district court
affirmed, that the FCC license did not qualify as
property to which a tax lien could be attached under
section 6321. Thus, the IRS had no lien on any

funds received by the estate attributable to the sale of
the license.
On appeal, the Third Circuit court broadly interpreted section 6321 to find that Congress meant to
reach every interest in property a taxpayer might
have. The court pointed out that it is well settled
that federal tax liens reach interests that are immune
from attachment by private creditors. The court considered factors such as alienability and value to determine whether the interest could be classified as
property or an interest in property.
The court found that the Communications Act itself seems to imply the existence of a limited property right in a broadcast license. For example, the
court noted that the FCC had established procedural
safeguards against arbitrary revocations of licenses,
permitted licenses to be transferred, and implied that
these licenses have value.
FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC
113 S. Ct. 1806 (1993)
Issue:
Whether enforcement of sections 4 and 5 of the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-385, 106 Stat. 14711481 ("Cable Act"), requiring cable operators to reserve a portion of their channel capacity for carrying
local commercial and noncommercial educational
broadcasting stations violates the First Amendment.
Holding:
The Supreme Court denied the petitioner's request for an injunction, holding that all acts of Congress were presumptively constitutional and should
remain in effect pending a final decision on the merits by the Court.
Discussion:
The Court pointed out that the applicants were
not merely seeking a stay of a lower court's order,
but an injunction against the enforcement of a presumptively valid act of Congress. The Court emphasized that an injunction is appropriate only in very
limited circumstances, when they meet jurisdictional
limitations and when the legal rights at issue are
"indisputably clear." The Court reasoned that it was
not indisputably clear that the petitioners had a First
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Amendment right to be free from government
regulation.
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC
819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993)
Issue:
Whether the must-carry provisions of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460
(1992) ("Cable Act"), violated the First Amendment
rights of cable television system operators.
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dustry. In the absence of such regulation, local
broadcast stations would be unable to compete. As a
result, they would lose advertising revenue and eventually lose their audiences. Therefore, the court
stated that regulation in this arena was necessary in
order to preserve the vitality of a free source of over
the air programming.
MASS MEDIA ISSUES
Action for Children's Television v. FCC
999 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1993)

Holding:
The United States District Court for the District
of Columbia held that the government need not
demonstrate that it has used the least restrictive
means to accomplish economic regulation of the
cable industry. The court concluded that the mustcarry provisions passed constitutional muster because
they furthered the significant government interest of
economic regulation of the cable industry.
Discussion:
The plaintiffs contended that the must-carry provisions of the Cable Act limited the freedom of cable
operators to refuse to carry the signals of local
broadcast stations and therefore violated the First
Amendment's right to freedom of speech. As such,
plaintiffs contended that the must-carry provisions
should be viewed under strict First Amendment
scrutiny.
The court declined to apply strict scrutiny, reasoning that the must-carry provisions did not compel
cable operators to carry any particular messages, nor
did they impose a burden on programmers or broadcasters regarding messages they proposed to transmit. In other words, strict scrutiny should be applied
only if governmental regulation is overtly contentbased or presents an opportunity for official censorship. The must-carry rules are only minimally content-based, if at all, and as such are not properly the
subject of strict scrutiny.
The court determined that the correct inquiry was
whether the must-carry provisions further a significant government interest. The court stated that the
significant government interest at issue was an economic one. The court mentioned that the First
Amendment should not unduly inhibit Congress in
what clearly appeared on its face to be an effort to
level the economic playing field in the television in-

Whether the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") can be required to
take action to combat "hidden television commercials" which promote smoking.
Holding:
The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit denied Action for Children's Television's
("ACT") petition for review of the FCC's decision
denying ACT's request that the FCC take action to
combat hidden commercials on television that promote smoking.
Discussion:
In 1990, ACT petitioned the FCC to issue a declaratory ruling requiring licensees to air anti-smoking messages to offset the harm caused by "hidden
commercials"-cigarette company sponsorship of
sporting events during which cigarette brand names
or logos are displayed on signs or banners, which are
broadcast during televised coverage of these events.
The FCC denied the petition, finding that this issued
had previously been raised and resolved.
The court held that given the FCC's broad discretion as to how to deploy its limited resources, it was
reasonable for the FCC to deny ACT's request. The
court concluded that Congress provided a general
ban on television cigarette advertising as part of a
"comprehensive" federal program. Hence, if the ban
was being violated at its perimeters, the courts, and
not the FCC, would be the proper venue for review.
In The Matter of Tak Communications, Inc.
985 F.2d 916 (7th Cir. 1993)
Issue:
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COURT DECISIONS

Whether Federal Communications Commission
("FCC" or "Commission") policy precludes creditors from holding security interests in broadcast
licenses.
Holding:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that the FCC has consistently refused to recognize creditors' interests in broadcast licenses. This policy is based on statutes which
prohibit assignment of broadcast licenses without
prior FCC approval. The court held that the decision as to whether or not to allow creditors to hold
security interests in broadcast licenses should be the
domain of the Commission.
Discussion:
Tak Communications, Inc.'s ("Tak") secured
creditors sought to have their liens on Tak's broadcast licenses declared valid when Tak filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy court and
the district court agreed that the liens were invalid
because FCC policy precluded creditors from holding security interests in FCC licenses. In affirming
this decision, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that
broadcast licenses indeed constitute property of a
debtor's estate.
The court noted that the bankruptcy court in In re
Ridgely Communications, Inc., 139 Bankr. 374
(Bankr. D. Md. 1992), held that a creditor may perfect a security interest in a debtor's broadcast license.
This right is limited to the extent of the proceeds
received by the licensee from a private buyer.
The court in the present case held that it does not
necessarily follow from Ridgely (as Tak's creditors
argued) that a creditor may hold a security interest
in that license per se. To support this holding, the
court noted the FCC's consistent refusal to recognize
such security interests.
Weyburn Broadcasting v. FCC
984 F.2d 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
Issue:
Whether the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC" or "Commission") treatment of various issues in the comparative hearing process violated the standard of reasoned decisionmaking set
forth in the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").

Holding:
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that, although reviewing courts grant a high level of deference to administrative decisionmaking, the FCC did not adhere to
the APA's standard of reasoned decisionmaking in
that it did not deal adequately with the financial
qualification, misrepresentation and real party-in-interest issues raised in this matter.
Discussion:
Appellants were competing applicants for a new
FM station in Richmond, Virginia. They challenged
the application of James River Communications
Corporation on several issues, including financial
qualifications, real party-in-interest and misrepresentation. The FCC resolved the financial qualifications issue in favor of James River, and declined to
designate the other issues for hearing.
The D.C. Circuit, while acknowledging the high
level of deference due the Commission, found that
the FCC failed to act reasonably in resolving the financial qualifications issue. The Commission argued
that its rules authorized granting a summary decision in favor of James River, because there was no
genuine issue as to any material fact.
The court held that the FCC was wrong, notwithstanding the Commission's substantial discretion, because there were significant questions of material
fact regarding James River's financial qualifications.
In particular, the court was troubled by the fact that
James River's written financial plan excluded substantial legal and engineering costs. The court noted
the fact that the FCC has historically disqualified
applicants lacking clear and complete financial
plans. The court also noted that the administrative
law judge put restraints on discovery that ensured
the impossibility of adequately addressing the financial qualifications issue.
Regarding the misrepresentation issue, the FCC
argued that such matters are solely within its discretion, and that the courts should not interfere. However, the court held that the Commission failed to
acknowledge the materiality of the misrepresentation
involved here. Because the misrepresentation was related to James River's financial qualifications, the
court reasoned that it was particularly important.
The court concluded that the misrepresentation issue
should have been designated for hearing.
Finally, the court concluded that the real party-ininterest issue should also have been designated for
hearing. The court saw the Commission's failure to
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do so as a sharp departure from precedent. The
court further reasoned that this issue was closely tied
to the misrepresentation and financial qualifications
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issues and for that reason a full hearing was
necessary.

